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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Continental
T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 1 casts considerable doubt on the continu-
ing validity of Albrecht v. Herald Co.2  In GTE Sylvania the Supreme
Court overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,I which had held
that a manufacturer's imposition of nonprice restrictions on its independ-
ent distributors was per se illegal. One year after the Court announced the
Schwinn per se rule on nonprice vertical restraints, the Court announced
the Albrecht per se rule against manufacturer's restrictions on the maxi-
mum resale price charged by independent distributors.
Perhaps reflecting the changed composition of the Court,, GTE
Sylvania signifies a retreat from the Court's frequent finding of per se
illegality in decisions of the previous decade, and a step toward greater
emphasis on the economic effects of the questioned conduct. As stated by
Justice Powell in GTE Sylvania, the "rule of reason,"" a determination of
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1. 433 U.S. 36(1977).
2. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
3. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). For an exhaustive list of articles criticizing the Sdhwintin decision, see
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36. 48 n.13 (1977). See gcncratll ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION. MONOGRAPii No. 2, Vertical Restrictions Limiting Ittral'rand Comnpetllon
(1977) [hereinafter cited as MONOGRAPH].
4. Vertical maximum resale price restraints must be distinguished from mnininum resale price
restraints or what has commonly been referred to as resale price maintenance agreements. This Article
equates vertical minimum resale price restraints with the concept ol resale price maintenance,
Although the term "resale price maintenance" is broad enough to encompass minimum and
maximum resale prices because both forms of price control allow th' manufacturer to maintain the
resale price of his products, judges and commentators have invariably used the term to refer only to
minimum resale price agreements. See, e.g.. Albrecht v. Herald Co.. 3i)0 U.S. 145. 157 (1968) (Harlan.
J., dissenting).
5. Justices Powell. Burger. Stewart. Blackmun and Stevens comprised the majority in GTE
Slvania. All but Justice Stewart have joined the Court since the Albrecht decision. and Jtutice
Stewart was a dissenter in Albrecht. The two dissenters in GTE ,Silvanla. Justices Brennan and
Marshall were members of the majority in Albrecht. Justice White. the author of the l lhr c'ht opinion.
filed a concurring opinion in GTE Sylvania in an attempt to justify the Court's holding without
overruling Schwinn. 433 U.S. at 59-71.
6. Using a "rule of reason" test, the factfinder weighs all the circtmstances to determine whether
a restrictive practice unreasonably restricts competition. Justice Brandeis explained thi ,standard in
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States. 246 U.S. 231.238 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied: its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed: the nature of the restraint and its effect. actual or probable, he
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
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the conduct's unreasonability, is now to be "the prevailing standard of
analysis" for litigation under section I of the Sherman Act;7 a per se rule of
illegality should be applied only to conduct that rises to the "demanding
standards of Northern Pac. R. Co."8 and is conclusively shown to be
"manifestly anticompetitive." 9 The Court endeavored to "make clear that
departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon
demonstrable economic effect rather than-as in Schwinn-upon
formalistic line drawing."10
This Article will demonstrate that the Albrecht per se rule does not
meet the GTESylvania requirements for imposition of per se illegality and,
therefore, should be overruled. The first section of this Article establishes
that the Albrecht per se rule, like the Schwinn per se rule, was not based
upon demonstrable economic effect. The second section examines the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of maximum resale price
restraints and concludes that such restraints are not manifestly anticom-
petitive. The final section of this Article disposes of two obstacles that
might be thought to prevent the reversal of Albrecht. First, it will be
demonstrated that the Supreme Court in GTE Sylvania has rejected the
"economic freedom" rationale for striking down vertical restrictions and
has substituted in its place the analysis utilized in Part III of this Article.
Next, it will be shown that the limitation of GTE Sylvania in footnote
eighteen to nonprice vertical restrictions does not prevent a re-
examination of the per se rule when maximum price restrictions are
concerned.
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMONSTRABLE ECONOMIC EFFECT
A. Albrecht, GTE Sylvania and Their Forerunners
In Albrecht, the Herald Company sold its newspapers through a
distribution system of independent carriers that had been used since the
newspaper began publication. The carrier, who bought papers at whole-
sale and resold them at retail, could be terminated after sixty days notice if
he charged more than the suggested retail price advertised in the newspap-
er. Plaintiff carrier, Albrecht, adhered to the suggested retail price for
several years, but in 1961 he began to overcharge. In 1964, after receiving
numerous complaints from customers in Albrecht's territory and issuing
repeated warnings, the newspaper company sent to Albrecht a letter that
stated:
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse: but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
7. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal,- 15
U.S.C. § I (1970).
8. 433 U.S. at 50. See note 31 and accompanying text infra.
9. i. at 49-50.
10. M.at58-59.
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The system we customarily follow of respecting as exclusive territories of our
carriers prevents the normal effect of competition to keep prices down. In
order to protect the reading public against artificially high prices in restraint
of trade in the territories of overpricing carriers, we have expressed in our
statement of policy the intention to compete in such territories by selling the
Globe-Democrat at resale ourselves or for resale by another carrier at the
lower prices in the over-priced territory."
The Herald Company hired Milne Circulation Sales, Inc. to solicit the
plaintiff's customers for alternate service. The newspaper company
assigned those customers who accepted alternate service to another
carrier, Kroner, with the understanding that Kroner's route would be
terminated in the event that Albrecht cooperated. Albrecht, however,
brought a treble damage action under section 1 of the Sherman Act; the
Herald Company responded with a sixty-day notice of termination.'"
Albrecht's complaint alleged that the Herald Company had combined with
Milne, Kroner, or Albrecht's customers to restrain trade in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act by attempting to enforce maximum resale
prices. The jury found for the Herald Company. The Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the denial of Albrecht's motion for judgment n.o.v. because the
Herald Company had acted unilaterally rather than in combination, and
because maximum resale prices promoted rather than restrained price
competition.1
3
Although the court of appeals' decision in Albrecht appeared to be
soundly based upon the crucial finding that the newspaper publisher was
merely attempting to control the abuse of retail monopolies by his
distributors, the Supreme Court reversed. First, the majority found that
combinations existed between the Herald Company and Milne, and the
Herald Company and Kroner.14 Second, the Court held that any attempt
to enforce maximum resale prices constituted illegal price fixing and,
therefore, fell within the same per se rule that condemns minimum resale
I1. Albrecht v. Herald Co.. 367 F.2d 517.519 (8th Cir. 1966). revid. 390 U.S, 145 (1968).
12. 390 U.S. at 48.
13. Id. at 148-49.
14. 390 U.S. at 149-50. The Albrecht decision broke new ground in construing the concept oh
"combination" in § I of the Sherman Act. The Court determined that the Herald Company could not
be deemed to have acted unilaterally against Albrecht because it hired NI ilne to solicit customers away
from Albrecht and the company was "aware" that the aim of the solicitation campaign was to force
Albrecht to lower his prices. Id. at 150. Also, the Herald Company combined with Kroner becanwe
Kroner knew the Herald Company was using him as"part of a program" toget Albrecht toconlorm to
the advertised price, and because Kroner undertook to deliver papers at the suggestcd price and
"materially aided" in the accomplishment of the Herald Company's plan. Al Furthermore. in the
now famous footnote six of the Albrecht opinion, the Court stated that other possible combinationm
under § I included the Herald Company and Albrecht. the Herald Company and the other carrier%, and
the Herald Company and Albrecht's customers. Justice Harlan critici/ed these various theories of
"combination" in his dissent. Id. at 160-65 (Harlan. J. dissenting). Ir, addition, commentators have
argued that Justice White's expansive interpretation of "combination" mn Albr ht to mean something
other than "contract" or "conspiracy" is an unwarranted interpretation of § I of the Sherman Act, Se'sc.
e.g.. Day, New Theories of Agreenient and Combination. 42 AxTITut I .1srI. 297. 299-31 (1973), Se't
also Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman A ct: (onscious Parallchvlo and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962).
[Vol. 39:496
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price fixing.'5 Thus, without economic analysis, the Supreme Court
applied a per se rule to maximum resale price restraints.1
6
The dissenters in Albrecht severely criticized the reasoning of the
majority. Justice Harlan stated that "[t]o conclude that no acceptable
justification for fixing maximum prices can be found simply because there
is no acceptable justification for fixing minimum prices is to substitute
blindness for analysis.' 7 Justice Stewart, in an opinion joined by Justice
Harlan, concluded that to apply a per se rule to maximum resale price
restraints when a distributor has a territorial monopoly "stands the
Sherman Act on its head." 8
Although Albrecht concerned vertical maximum resale price re-
straints, GTE Sylvania presented the problem of nonprice vertical restric-
tions.' 9 The GTE Sylvania Court's examination of the Schirnn per se
rule, however, provides the framework for a similar review of the Albrecht
per se rule. A brief review of the Supreme Court's experience with
nonprice vertical restraints provides the background necessary to under-
stand the impact of GTE Sylvania upon Albrecht.
White Motor Co. v. United States'0 was the first nonprice vertical
restriction case to reach the Supreme Court.' White Motor Company
had imposed geographic limitations on the areas within which its
distributors and dealers were permitted to sell trucks and parts. In
addition, the company had engaged in other offensive practices, such as
price fixing. With respect to the territorial restrictions, the Supreme Court
15. 390 U.S. at 151-54.
16. The Court did suggest possible anticompetitive consequences that could result from
maximum price fixing. See notes 96-107 and accompanying text infra.
17. 390 U.S. at 157 (Harlan.J.. dissenting).
18. Id. at 170 (Stewart & Harlan, JJ.. dissenting). Justice Douglas also filed a concurring
opinion to point out that Albrecht was a "rule of reason" case. Id. at 154 (Douglas J.. concurring).
How Justice Douglas could reach that conclusion is beyond the comprehension ol this ssriter. no
subsequent court has construed Albrecht as a rule of reason case.
19. Vertical nonprice restraints have generally been divided into two categories: (1) territorial
restrictions and (2) customer restrictidns. Territorial restrictions limit the geographical area in sshich
a distributor may sell the manufacturer's product, and include restrictions of the distributor's place
of business or area of operation. Customer restrictions limit the customers to s horn a distributor may
sell. See generally Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act. 75 H,,Rv. L.
REv. 795 (1962). The GTE Sylvania case dealt with vertical territorial restrictions. Because its share of
the television market had been declining steadily over the years. Sylvania decided to change its
marketing strategy by selling television sets directly to smaller groups of franchised retailers isho ' ere
more "aggressive and competent." 433 U.S. at 38. To implement this plan. each selected franchisee
was required to sell his Sylvania products from the franchise location. A franchise did not constitute
an exclusive territory, however, because Sylvania retained the sole right to increase the number of
retailers in an area in light of the success or failure of existing retailers in developing the market. I
20. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
21. Prior to 1948. nonprice vertical restrictions were never challenged by the Federal Trade
Commission or the Department of Justice. In that year the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department sua sponte announced its position that vertical territorial restrictions si ere per se illegal.
White Motor Co. was the first case to reach the Supreme Court under the Justice Departmentes ness
policy. See Orrick. Marketing Restrictions huposed to Protect the hutegrit' .of Franchi.se Distribu-
tion Syste'ns. 36 A.ITTRtI'T L.J. 63. 65 (1967): Timberg. Territorial retsives. 29 A l\TRt sT L...
233, 234-36 (1965).
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reversed a summary judgment granted in favor of the government on a per
se rule of illegality, stating:
We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of these
arrangements on competition to decide whether they have such a "pernicious
effect on competition and lack . . . any redeeming -virtue" (Northern Pac.
R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)) and therefore should be
classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act.
Nevertheless, only four years later in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.,23 the Supreme Court summarily declared certain nonprice
vertical restraints to be per se illegal in sale transactions.
To sell its bicycles, Schwinn operated under three plans: (1) selling to
distributors who purchased bicycles from Schwinn; (2) selling to retailers
by means of consignment or agency arrangements with distributors; and
(3) selling to retailers under the "Schwinn plan," which involved direct
shipments by Schwinn to the retailer, with Schwinn invoicing the dealers,
extending credit, and paying a commission to the distributor taking the
order.24 Schwinn's distributors were assigned specific territories for
conducting sales. Sales were to be restricted to franchised Schwinn
accounts and to be conducted entirely in the area allocated to the
individual distributor. In turn, the franchised dealers were required to
purchase Schwinn products only from the distributor authorized to serve
that area. The dealer could not sell to unfranchised dealers nor could he
sell as a wholesaler without bearing the risk of immediate cancellation of
his franchise by Schwinn. The Government sought to have this arrange-
ment declared an unreasonable restraint on competition contrary to
section 1 of the Sherman Act.
25
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, which had held that
when Schwinn sold its products to distributors and imposed territorial
restrictions upon resale, a per se violation of the Sherman Act occurred.26
The Court emphasized that once a manufacturer ceases to have own-
ership rights in its product, the manufacturer may not dictate the lo-
cation or terms of resale.2' As long as Schwinn continued to possess title
to its products, such as under a consignment arrangement or a Schwinn
plan, Schwinn could impose territorial restrictions on resale without
committing a per se violation because the dealer was acting more like an
agent of Schwinn. The Court based this bifurcated treatment on age-old
property concepts, that is, once a person acquires title to property, the
former owner no longer has the right to interfere with the use of that
22. 372 U.S. at 263.
23. 388 U.S. at 379-80.
24. Id. at 370.
25. Id. at 367.
26. Id. at 379.
27. Id.
[Vol. 39:49)6
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property. 28 The latter portion of this Article discusses the Schwinn
Court's reliance on property concepts to justify a per se rule of illegality as
it affects maximum resale price restraints. It is important to note at this
point, however, that the court in GTE Sylvania returned to the cautionary
White Motor Co. approach29 and criticized Schwinn for "announc[ing] its
sweeping per se rule without even a reference to Northern Pacific Railway
Co., and with no explanation of its sudden change in position."' The
Court then proceeded to reexamine Schwinn to determine whether its per
se rule could be justified under the "demanding standards" of Northern
Pacific:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use.3'
The Supreme Court in Albrecht, as in Schwinn, did not refer to the
criteria established in Northern Pacific for applying a per se rule of
illegality. Thus, in light of GTE Sylvania, the Albrecht per se rule should
be reexamined to determine whether it can be justified under the Northern
Pacific standard. The precise issue is whether judicial experience with
vertical maximum resale price restraints has demonstrated that such
business practices "have or are likely to have a 'pernicious effect on
competition' or whether they lack . . . any redeeming virtue.' 32
In view of the Court's scant experience with maximum resale prices,
however, it was premature for the Albrecht Court to conclude that vertical
maximum resale price restraints are manifestly anticompetitive and should
therefore be proscribed by a per se rule of illegality.3 3  In fact, prior to
Albrecht, the Supreme Court's only experience with maximum resale
prices was in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons.3 4
28. Id. at 380.
29.
We revert to the standard articulated in Northern Pac R. Co. and reiterated in White Motor,
for determining whether vertical restrictions must be "conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use."
433 U.S. at 57.
30. Id. at 51.
31. Id. at 50 (quoting Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
32. The Supreme Court in GTE Sylvania determined that nonprice vertical restrictions did not
meet the Northern Pacific standards. Id. at 58.
33. The Albrecht per se rule has been severely criticized. See, e.g., W. GELLIIORN, ANTITURuST
LAW AND EcoNO ucS 260-61 (1976); Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass- li'entr-ktrst
Annual Antitrust Review, 57 CALIF. .L. REV. 182, 193-96 (1969); Posner. Antitrust Policy and the
Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution. Horizontal Merger and Potential
Competition Decision, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 291-92 (1975); 7he Supreme Court. 1967 Term. 82
HARV. L. REV. 63, 257 (1968); Comment, M1faximum Price Fixing: A Per Se Violation of the Sherman
Act, 1969 L. & Soc. ORDER 476 (1969); 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 208 (1968): 37 U. CaN. L. REv.41 1(1968). See also Elman, "PetrifiedOpinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLLM. L. REv°. 625 (1966).
34. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Before Kiefer-Stewcart, the vast majority of cases dealt with minimum or
absolute price fixing by sellers. For instance, in Swift & Co. v. United States. 196 U.S. 375 (1905). the
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In Kiefer-Stewart, two affiliated corporations, Seagram and Calvert,
entered into an alleged horizontal agreement to impose maximum resale
prices on the liquor that they sold to Indiana wholesalers. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that any agreement among competitors to
impose maximum resale prices simply did not violate the Sherman Act, -'
reasoning that only price-fixing combinations that restrain competition
violate section 1. Since price competition rests only upon the freedom to
charge lower, not higher, prices, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a
maximum resale price agreement promotes competition and benefits the
consumer by ensuring lower prices for consumer goods.: 6  On appeal,
however, the Supreme Court reversed in an opinion noted for its brevity."
In a single paragraph the Court held that a maximum resale price
agreement, like a minimum resale price maintenance agreement, was a per
se violation of the antitrust laws:
For such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the
freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with
their own judgment. We reaffirm what we said in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co.....: "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for
the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is
illegalper se."
38
More than twenty-five years later, the Kiefer-Stewart decision pro-
vided the rationale for the Albrecht holding.39 The Kiefer-Stewart case,
however, is distinguishable from Albrecht. In Kiefer-Stewart, the Su-
preme Court held merely that "an agreement among competitors to fix
maximum resale prices of their products" violated the Sherman Act. 4" By
contrast, Albrecht involved a vertical maximum resale price agreement
Supreme Court upheld an indictment charging the defendents, in part. with conspiring "to arbitrarily,
from time to time raise, lower, and fix prices, and to maintain uniform prices." L. at 392, The Court
did not, however, discuss the maximum price fixing charge and it seems that the Court's real concern
was the general scheme to monopolize the industry. See Comment. The Per Se Illgalitv o/ Pri'e-
Fixing-Sans Power, Purpose or Effect, 19 U. Cmt. L. Rtv. 837. 843 n.36 (1952). In Kitefr-Stcwart
the Supreme Court relied on broad dictum from United States v. Socoy-Vacuum Oil Co,. 310 U.S.
150, 223 (1940). This reliance on SoconyI-Vacuum. however, has been criticiled. For example.
former FTC Commissioner Elman writes:
The agreement at issue in Socony-Vacuum was an agreement among competitors to restrict tile
supply of their product, its purpose and effect were to eliminate competition and raise prices, The
Court was thus plainly warranted in assimilating the agreement to a conventional price-fixing
conspiracy. Indeed, this "price tampering" was tantamount in character and result to such a
conspiracy. Certainly the Supreme Court did not hold that any practice by a manufacturer which
may affect the resale price is illegal per se price fixing. those who say it did ignore the context in
which the Court used the phrase and by which it was limited and defined.
Elman, supra note 33 at 629. Thus, except for the broad dictum in Socont Vacuum, no court had
ruled that a maximum resale price agreement among competitors violated the antitrust laws prior to
the Kiefer-Stewart decision in 1951.
35. 182 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1950), revId, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
36. Id.
37. See generally Comment, supra note 34.
38. 340 U.S. at 213 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150.223 (1940)).
39. 390 U.S. at 152-53.
40. 340 U.S. at 213.
[Vol. 39:496
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between a manufacturer and its distributors, noncompetitors at different
levels of the market structure. As Justice Harlan observed in his dissent in
Albrecht:
[In Kiefer-Stewart], the key question was whether there was an actual
horizontal combination of manufacturers to impose on retailers a maximum
resale price. The Court refused to hold that dictation of price ceilings to a
single retailer by a single manufacturer was unlawful, but instead insisted
upon, and found, a situation in which two manufacturers, in their common
interest, combined to impose upon retailers a condition of doing business
which they might not have been able to demand individually.4'
Prior to Albrecht, the circuits were sharply divided on whether Kiefer-
Stewart dictated a per se rule against a single manufacturer imposing price
ceilings on products sold to distributors. The Fifth Circuit construed
Kiefer-Stewart to establish a per se rule,42 but the First 43 and Eighth
Circuits44 upheld price ceilings imposed by a single manufacturer on its
distributors, basing their decisions in part upon the crucial finding that
vertical maximum resale price restraints promoted competition.
B. The Minimum Price-Fixing Analogy
It appears proper to characterize maximum resale price restraints and
minimum resale price agreements as different forms of the same con-
demned practice. Such an approach, however- circumvents the real issue:
Whether maximum resale price restraints have the same pernicious effect
on competition as minimum resale price agreements. Yet in Kiefer-
Stewart and Albrecht, the Supreme Court avoided the task of showing
maximum resale price restraints to be anticompetitive by analogizing them
to the dissimilar minimum resale price restraints before it. Upon close
scrutiny, the analogy between minimum and maximum price fixing cannot
be justified. As Justice Harlan states in his dissent in Albrecht, "it]he
practice of setting genuine price 'ceilings,' that-is maximum prices, differs
from the practice of fixing minimum prices, and no accumulation of
pronouncements from the opinions of this Court can render the two
41. 390 U.S. at 164 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346,349 (5th Cir. 1965). The Fifth Circuit
held on the basis of Kiefer-Stewari. that the oil company's attempt to compel Broussard. a gasoline
station operator, to reduce his pump prices constituted a per seviolation of§ I even though thealleged
purpose of the defendant's action was to promote competition. Id.
43. Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273 (Ist Cir. 1967). The facts were similar to Brou.sard.
Mobil Oil Co., dissatisfied with the high pump prices being charged by Quinn. applied various
pressures and eventually terminated Quinn's dealership contract. The First Circuit held the contract
termination was unilateral, and, therefore, the combination requirement of§ I had not been met. i. at
276. In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Coffin pointed out that even if Quinn had proved the
existence of a combination, he would distinguish Kiefer-Ste'art and would not find an attempt by a
single manufacturer to impose price ceilings to be a per se violation of the antitrust la% s. ld.at276-78
(Coffin, J., concurring).
44. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1966), rer'd, 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
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economically equivalent."45 That is, if a manufacturer establishes maxi-
mum prices, a reseller is still free to offer a lower price for tile manuflactur-
er's product in the face of price competition from another reseller.
Unlike raximum resale price agreements. vertical minimum resale
price agreements were early declared per se illegal by the Supreme Court.
The 1911 case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons46 held
that an agreement between a drug manufacturer and its customers to
maintain a minimum resale price constituted a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.47  The medical company had routinely sold products to
wholesale druggists who resold the products to retail stores for consumer
sales. The Dr. Miles Company required each of its wholesalers and
jobbers to sell the drugs at itemized prices and also to obtain similar pricing
agreements from the retail stores.48  Thus, the manufacturer was able to
fix the prices of its products down the entire chain of resale. In concluding
that these agreements constituted per se violations of the Sherman Act, the
Court equated the effects of minimum resale price agreements with
horizontal price fixing among dealers.49 The Supreme Court has subse-
quently reaffirmed this analogy.5
In response to Dr. Miles, pressure was put on Congress to permit
exemptions to the per se rule prohibiting minimum resale price agree-
ments. These lobbying efforts eventually resulted in the passage of the
Miller-Tydings Act' and the McGuire Act.52  These statutes permitted
states to enact "fair trade" laws authorizing sellers to establish minimum or
stipulated resale prices for branded commodities. Forty-six states have
operated under fair trade legislation." In the 1970s, however, several
states repealed their fair trade laws.54  Eventually the Consumer Goods
Pricing Act of 1975 was enacted to repeal the Miller-Tydings and McGuire
Acts.;5 The principal impetus for this turnabout was that empirical
studies undertaken by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
56and others5  had revealed that minimum resale price maintenance agree-ments tended to produce artificially high prices.
45. 390 U.S. at 156 (Harlan. J.. dissenting).
46. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
47. httrabrand competition refers to competition between ditstrbiors ot the same product,
while interbrand competition occurs between manufacturers of the same generic product, See
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.. 433 U.S. 36. 52 n.19 (1977).
48. 220 U.S. at 374.
49. lI. at 408.
50. See. e.g.. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.. 341 U.S. 384(1951): United Statev.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) Frey & Son. Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 US.
208 (1921): United States v. A. Schrader's Son. Inc.. 252 U.S. 85 (192D),
51. Ch. 690.50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed 1975). See note 55 and accompanying text inlra,
52. Ch. 745. 66 Stat. 631 (1952) (repealed 1975). See note 55 and accompanying text nlra,
53. See 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 6041 (1978).
54. See ANTITRUST Lxw DEVELOPMENTS 9-14 (1975).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970)),
56. See Hearings on S.408 Before the Subc onmn. on Antitru t wd ,'fwionoli ol the S'enate
[Vol. 39:-496¢
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Because a \ertical minimum resale price maintenance agreement
benelits the distributor by eliminating intrabrand price competition.
courts have recognized that a series ol \ertical agreements between a
manufacturer and each of his distributors can create a co cfor hori/ontal
price fixing among the distributors s' It \av, this suspicion that prompted
the Supreme Court to adopt a per se rule against minimum resale price
agreements in Dr. Miles: "[T]he complainant can fare no better with its
plan of identical contracts than could dealers themsel% es if they formed a
combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions, and thus to
achieve the same result, by agreement with each other."". In other words.
organized distributors can pressure an unwilling manufacturer into adopt-
ing minimum resale price agreements in order to protect dealer profit
margins. During the 1975 Senate Fair Trade Hearings. one Justice
Department official testified that" 'fair trading' historically resulted from
pressure upon producers by retailers, and ... chiefly benefits retailers by
insulating them from price competition. '" S9
Hence, a per se rule against minimum resale price agreements has
been justified for two reasons. First, minimum resale pi ice agreements
substantially reduce price competition in a manufacturer's product among
its distributors. In Albrecht, Justice Harlan argued that this fact alone
justified a per se minimum resale price agreement rule:
[Plrice floors are properly considered perse restraints, in the sense that once a
combination to create them has been demonstrated, no proffered justification
is an acceptable defense. Following the rule of reason, combinations to fix
price floors are invariably unreasonable: to the extent that they achieve their
objective, they act to the direct detriment of the public interest as view ed in
the Sherman Act.
60
Second, minimum resale price agreements are unlikely to be created absent
pressure from resellers. Thus, as Justice Harlan further stated. "[lI]t is
frequently possible to infer a combination of resellers behind what is
presented to the world as a vertical and unilateral price policy, because it is
the resellers and not the manufacturer who reap the direct benefit of the
policy."
6
'
In stark contrast to the anticompetitive effects resulting from min-
Judiciary Comm.. 94th Cong.. Ist Sess. 174 (1975) (cited in MoNoGRwJIl. iu ra note 3. at 79 n,271
I hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate Fair Trade Hearings].
57. See. e.g.. B. Y \xitY. R~s xt.E PRICE M \is.TE\ ('.c 96-97(1966): Bos mman. Mew Prerqu ltt%
and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. Ci. L. REv. 825 (1955); Cassady. Maintenance of
Resale Prices by Manufacturers, 53 Q. J. EcoN. 454 (1939); Grether, Experience in California With
Fair Trade Legi.lation. 24 CxUA L. RiEv. 640 (1936): and sources cited in 1975 Snate linr TraJe
Hearings. supra note 56. at 175 n.5 (cited in MO\OGRAPri. supra note 3. at 79 n.328).
58. 220 U.S. at 408.
59. 1975 Senate Fair Trade Hearings. supra note 56. at 174 (cited in Moot,R %11. 'tpra note 1.
at 79 n.326).
60. 390 U.S. at 157 (Harlan.J.. dissenting).
61. Id.
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imum resale price agreements, no empirical study demonstrates that
maximum resale price agreements achieve comparable results. Judges
and commentators, who have evaluated the effects of maximum resale
price agreements, have invariably concluded that maximum resale price
agreements promote competition by providing the manufacturer with an
effective tool for counteracting the anticompetitive effects of reseller
monopolies.62
III. THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF VERTICAL MAXIMUM
RESALE PRICE RESTRAINTS
This section of the Article examines the competitive effects of vertical
maximum resale price restraints and demonstrates that the Albrecht per se
rule does not meet the criteria for applying the per se rule enunciated in
GTESlvania.63 The Supreme Court in GTESrlvania reaffirmed the rule
of reason: In determining whether a particular commercial practice is
manifestly anticompetitive, "[tihe probability that anticompetitive conse-
quences will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences
must be balanced against its procompetitive consequences."" Vertical
maximum resale price restraints have two major procompetitive conse-
quences. First, such restraints allow a manufacturer to control distributor
monopolies. Second, they promote independent distributorship systems
and prevent forward vertical integration. When these two procompetitive
effects are weighed against the alleged anticompetitive effects, it is clear
that vertical maximum resale price restraints are not manifestly anticom-
petitive.
A. Procompetitive Effects of Vertical Maximum
Retail Price Restraints
1. Controlling Distributor Monopolies
Vertical maximum resale price restraints allow a manufacturer to
control distributor monopolies. As Justice Harlan stated in Albrecht:
"Since price ceilings reflect the manufacturer's view that there is insuffi-
cient competition to drive down prices to a competitive level, they have the
arguable justification that they prevent retailers or wholesalers from
reaping monopoly or supercompetitive profits."" As the Eighth Circuit
also concluded: "Globe-Democrat's activity here did not hinder, but
fostered and actually created competition to the benefit of the public. To
62. Albrecht%. Herald Co..390 U.S. 145.159(l968)(Hirian.J..discnting).rcrniu e.3 671 2d
517. 524-25 (8th Cir. 1966); Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co. 375 F.2d 273. 276-78 (1st Cir. 1967) (Colli.
J.. concurring). See also Comment, supra note 34. at 843.
63. See note 31. and accompanying text supra.
64. 433 U.S. at50 n.16.
65. 390 U.S. at 159 (Harlan. J.. dissenting).
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have condoned plaintiff's overcharging would have been a signal to all
carriers, each monopolistic in his own right, to mulct the public for all the
traffic would bear."66
Economists also support the utilization of vertical maximum resale
price restraints as a defensive measure for controlling distributor monopo-
lies. For example, Professor Bork writes:
Maximum resale price fixing may .. .be a means by which a manufacturer
controls the misuse of a reseller's local monopoly. This situation may arise
where both the manufacturer and the reseller possess market pow-
er. . . .The manufacturer may wish to fix maximum resale prices to
insure that the reseller does not, in its independent interest, restrict output
further than is in their collective interest.
67
Moreover, Professor Bork argues that maximum resale price restraints
should be used by a manufacturer to break up a horizontal price-fixing
cartel among his distributors: "If a manufacturer knows, or suspects but
cannot prove, that resellers have cartelized, the manufacturer can provide
a powerful incentive for resellers to defect from the cartel by refusing to sell
to those that comply with the cartel's price agreement. Maximum resale
price fixing accomplishes that purpose.""5  Thus, in stark contrast to
minimum resale price restraints that facilitate dealer cartelizing, maximum
resale price restraints provide the manufacturer with a weapon to combat
dealer cartels.
Recall the facts of Albrecht. If an independent newspaper distributor
in some desolate area arbitrarily decides to raise his prices, his customers
often can only choose between accepting higher prices or cancelling their
subscriptions. Since a newspaper is a perishable product that must be
delivered promptly to customers in a concentrated area, it is not feasible
for newspaper distributors to compete with each other beyond the areas
within which regular deliveries may be efficiently completed. Thus.
independent newspaper distributors like Albrecht have naturally protect-
ed territorial monopolies.69
The Albrecht decision undoubtedly has had a severe impact on the
newspaper industry by effectively guaranteeing a preferred status to retail
monopolies. Evidence indicates that since Albrecht, newspaper publish-
ing companies have experienced sharp declines in circulation due to resale
66. 367 F.2d 517. 522 (8th Cir. 1966). revtW. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). The only majorstudy of the
Kiefer-Stewart case concludes that although the Courts motiv e for imposing maximum prices % as to
stimulate competition: the ruling in Kiefer-Stewart may ha% e disarmed manufacturers of one of their
few %%eapons against monopolistic distributors. Comment. stira note 34. at 843.
67. Bork. 7he Rule of Reason and ilhe Per Se Concept: Price-Fxing and tarAet Division 11.75
Y ,xii. l.J. 373.464-65 (1966).
68. h/. at 464.
69. See A Bill to Repeal the Fair Trade Laws Newspaper E'emption Aiwntient: Ilcarwnus
on S. 408 Before the Stthnnm. on Antitrust and Vooponlr of the Senate Commo. on ite Adtttari.
94th Cong.. Ist Sess. 394. 657-58 (1975) (testimony of William C. Green. Jr.) [hereinafter cited as
,\eii.paper Hearings].
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price increases by their independent distributors." Vertical maximum
resale price restraints would allow the newspaper publisher to control the
abuse of these retail monopolies. Aware of this potential lever, the
newspaper industry strongly supported a 1975 bill designed to overrule
Albrecht by exempting maximum resale price restraints from the antitrust
laws.71
In Albrecht, however, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
monopolistic-distributorjustification for maximum price fixing.12 Initial-
ly, the Court stated that the court of appeals was not entitled to rely upon
this justification because "neither the existence of exclusive territories nor
the economic power they might place in the hands of the dealers was at
issue before the jury., 73 Thus, if distributor monopoly power had been
proved, then the Herald Company might have been able to impose
maximum prices as a defensive measure. Declining to reach this conclu-
sion, however, the Court reasoned that if the distributors had monopoly
power, their exclusive territories would be illegal, and, consequently, the
"entire scheme" would be illegal under section 1:
The assertion that .illegal price fixing is justified because it blunts the
pernicious consequences of another distribution practice is unpersuasive. If
as the Court of Appeals said, the economic impact of territorial exclusivity
was such that the public could be protected only by otherwise illegal price
fixing itself injurious to the public, the entire scheme must fall under § I of the
Sherman Act.7
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Albrecht has been seriously
undermined by the GTE Sy'lvania decision. In GTE Sylvania, the
Supreme Court held that nonprice vertical restrictions, such as granting a
distributor an exclusive territory, do not have pernicious consequences
and therefore must be evaluated under a rule of reason standard.7" A
manufacturer is permitted to artificially create exclusive territories for its
distributors, and artificially reduce intrabrand competition among them,
In order to counteract the potential abuse of this reduction in competition
by distributors granted exclusive territories, a manufacturer should
instead have multiple distributors subject to restraints on the vertical
maximum resale price. One commentary on the GTE SIlvania decision
has argued that, on this basis, Albrecht should be reconsidered:
The Albrecht Court . . . felt that a price ceiling was not justified simply
"because it blunts the pernicious consequences" of vertically imposed terri-
torial restraints. Silvania, however, concluded that such nonprice restraints
70. See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
71. See Newspaper Hearings, supra note 69.
72. 390 U.S. at 153-54.
73. Id. at 153.
74. Id. at 154.
75. Although GTE Sylvania concerned location restrictions and not exclusive territories, the
decision was not limited to its facts and applies to all nonprice vertical restrictions, 433 U.S. at 51 n. 18.
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may be desirable. Once the manufacturer is permitted to create a "retail
monopoly" in order to promote goodwill by providing point-of-sale services,
it should also be given the opportunity to restrict the accompanying danger
by placing a ceiling on the retailer's markup.
76
The GTE Sylvania Court was not particularly concerned with the
potential anticompetitive effects of distributor monopolies because "[all-
though intrabrand competition may be reduced, the ability of retailers to
exploit the resulting market may be limited both by the ability of
consumers to travel to other franchised locations, and, perhaps more
importantly, to purchase the competing products of other manufactur-
ers."7 7 Although this statement was unsupported by market evidence, it is
reasonable because Sylvania's share of the television market was relatively
small (only five percent at the time of the suit), and television sets are highly
interchangeable products.78 GTE Sylvania should not be limited to its
facts. The clear import of the decision is that a rule of reason standard
should be applied to nonprice vertical restrictions generally. 79 Moreover,
even though franchisees as a whole do not possess monopoly market power,
particular franchisees, by virtue of their location or advertising efforts,
might have natural monopoly power. For example, the Court's reasoning
in GTE Sylvania assumes that the consumer will go to another franchised
location, or will buy a different brand television set. But what if the
Sylvania franchisee is the only television dealer in the surrounding area?
This is not a remote possibility. For example, declining sales in the San
Francisco area, caused by an additional markup- 6f $50 to $100 per
set by Continental T.V., prompted Sylvania to open a new franchise
in Continental's territory.80
2. The Prevention of Forward Vertical Integration
A manufacturer must develop a distribution system to distribute its
product to the consumer. A manufacturer that uses its own employees to
distribute and market its goods can impose whatever post-sale restrictions
it wants upon its distributors; the antitrust laws simply do not apply. If,
however, the manufacturer cannot afford to develop its own distribution
network, it must rely on some form of independent distributorship
system-loosely called franchising -that is subject to the antitrust laws
76. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term. 91 HARV. L. REV. 70.241 (1977).
77. 433 U.S. at 54.
78. Id. at38.
79. Id. at 51 n.18.
80. Brief for Respondent at 12, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania lnc..433 U.S. 36(1977).
81.
According to the FTC Ad Hoc Committee on Franchising, "[t]he term franchise as used in
the business world has been applied so indiscriminately, and to such diverse business
arrangements, as to defy consistent definition. At one extreme, it is a simple grant from one
party to another to sell the granting party's goods. At the other extreme, a franchise
relationship is a complex business arrangement in which the franchisor licenses his trade
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relating to vertical restrictions. An independent distributorship system
coupled with vertical restrictions provides the manufacturer a viable
alternative to an internal system of distribution, thus reducing forward
vertical integration.
82
The Schwinn and Albrecht decisions have been severely criticized for
taking away a manufacturer's right to control its independent distributors
through a network of vertical restrictions.83 By holding that vertical
restrictions were per se illegal in Schwinn and Albrecht, the Supreme
Court has accelerated the forward vertical integration of independent
distributorship systems. For example, after the Schwinn decision, Ar-
nold, Schwinn and Company vertically integrated forward. As one
commentator observed:
If the Court's purpose was to liberate Schwinn's 22 cycle distributors from
Schwinn's influence, the decision succeeded-but scarcely in a pro-
competitive way. Instead, the distributors were entirely liberated from the
Schwinn distribution process; Schwinn elected to cope with the vagaries of
the Court's decision by emulating General Motors, eliminating the middle
layer in its distribution organization, and substituting its own warehouse
facilities for those of the cycle distributors.
The Albrecht decision has also had a severe impact on the newspaper
industry. A newspaper's profits are largely derived from advertising
revenues, which in turn are based on circulation rates. Consequently, the
name and trademark, imparts in confidence his know-how, and on a continuing basis.
provides guidance and details concerning the precise manner in which the franchisee must
operate his establishment."
Report ofAd Hoc Committee on Franchising to the FTC 5 (June 2, 1969), notedin MoNoonAt'Isup1 ra
note 3, at I n.2.
82. It is an established commercial fact that franchising allows the small manufacturer to
effectively compete with the large vertically integrated giants of many industries. See generally, H.
BROWN, FRANCHISING REALITIES AND REMEDIES (1973); H. KURSI! TIlE FRANCIIISE BOOM (1968); F.
LEWIS & R. HANCOCK, THE FRANCHISING SYSTEM OF DISTRIBUTION (1968); SMALL BtiSINisS
ADMINISTRATION FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINEss, REPORT ON TIlE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF FRANCHISING, 92D CONG. IST. SEss. (1971).
83. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145. 156 (1968) (Harlan. ,.,, dissenting): United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 386-88, 394 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting).
See also Averill, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One: An Anal'sis and Prognosis, 15 N.Y.L.F, 39
(1969); Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: Fron White to Schwinn to Where. 44
ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975); Chadwell & Rhodes, Antitrust Aspects of Dealer Lhensing and Franchvls
ing, 62 Nw. U.L. Rv. 1 (1967); Jones, The Growth and Importance of Franchising andtlhe Role olithe
Law, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 717 (1967); Keck, Alternative Distribution Techniques- Franhhtili,
Consignment, Agency and Licensing, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 177 (1968); Keck, The Sehwinn Caw, 23
Bus. LAW 669 (1968); McLaren, Marketing Limitation on Independent Distributors andl Dealers
Prices, Territories, Customers, and Handling of Competitive Products. 13 ANTITRUST Bll t. 161
(1968); Orrick, Marketing Restrictions Imposed to Protect the Integrity of"Franchise" Distribution
Systems, 36 ANTITRUST L.J. 63, 65 (1967); Phillips, Schwinn Rules and the "New Economics" of
Vertical Relationships, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 573 (1975); Pollock, A lternative Distribution Afethod after
Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 595 (1968); Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangetnentv: Econonl
Analsis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAW & CONTEIP. PROB. 507 (1965); Sfikas, Antitri t
Consequences of Vertical Restrictions, 56 ILL. B.J. 1028 (1968); Stewart. Antitrust ConleratlonS
Involved in Product Distribution, 19 Bus. LAW 967 (1964); Zeidman, The Growth and hnlportance of
Franchising-Its Impact on Small Business, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. i 191 (1967).
84. Pollock, The Schwinn Per Se Rule: The Case for Reconsideration. 44 AmrRtmsr IJ. 557,
569-70 (1975).
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newspaper industry has a particularly keen interest in controlling the
pricing policies of its independent distributors. Since Albrecht, many
-newspaper distributors have increased their prices; circulation has fallen.
Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
pointed out that: "[throughout] the country there have been a number of
newspapers which had losses of circulation in recent years. From the
information available . . . it would appear that a substantial part of
these losses were caused by price increases by dealers."85
Because newspaper publishers lost control over the pricing policies of
their distributors after Albrecht, the larger publishers have simply skirted
the antitrust obstacle by vertically integrating forward. The outcropping
of antitrust suits brought by disgruntled independent newspaper distribu-
tors, who have either been terminated completely or forced to become
agents or employees, substantiates that newspaper publishers with suffi-
cient capital have vertically integrated forward. 6 In contrast, however,
smaller newspaper companies that do not have the necessary capital to
convert to an internal system of distribution have simply gone out of
business.87
From a purely economic standpoint, a manufacturer chooses an
independent-distributorship method of distribution, because it perceives
this system to be economically most efficient. 88 Only the larger, well-
85. Newspaper Hearings, supra note 69, at 394 (testimony of Robert E. Nelson). For example:
The Los Angeles Herald-Examiner lost control of prices a year or so ago and substantial
losses have indeed been sustained. According to the most recent Audit Bureau of Circula-
tion Report, covering the six months ending March31, 1975, the Herald-Examiner's average
daily circulation was down 37,140 copies and Sunday was off 65,543 copies from the
corresponding period of 1974. During that same period the Los Angeles Times was able to
maintain uniform pricing policies and, despite a general increase in home delivery rates.
average daily circulation declined only 12,626 while Sunday circulation increased by 4.235
copies.
Id. at 396.
86. See, e.g., Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. dcenied.433 U.S.
910 (1977); Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470.484 (D.D.C. 1977). Lamarca %.
Miami Herald Publishing Co., 395 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Fla. 1975). afrdnem.. 524 F.2d 1230(5th Cir.
1975); Millkarek v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 388 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D. Fla. 1975). In 'ewIberriv'.
Washington Post Co.. the court observed:
The Post shifted to the agency system largely as a result of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Albrecht, which cast doubt on the legality of systems ofdealerdistribution. such as the Post's.
then employed by many newspapers across the country. After an unsuccessful effort by the
industry to obtain relief from the Congress. the Post determined that a different method of
distribution was desirable to avoid the business risks involved and to assure orderly pricing of
its product.
438 F. Supp. 470,484 (D.D.C. 1977).
87. For example, testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoh
revealed that
[tihe total circulation of New York newspapers has declined steadily for many years.
. . . Seven New York newspapers had a combined circulation of 5.2 million in 1960. Only
three are being published today and their combined circulation has dropped to about 3.5
million! Retail prices, which have advanced substantially in recent years, were not totally
responsible for these losses but certainly were a contributing factor.
Newspaper Hearings. supra note 69, at 396 (remarks of Mr. Nelson).
88. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 67, at 429-65; Posner, supra note 33, at 283-99.
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established firms can afford the huge capital investment required to
vertically integrate forward. 9 When a per se rule of illegality is applied to
vertical restrictions, "[t]he result for some manufacturers may be a sad
choice between a law suit or less effective distribution." ' Moreover,
smaller manufacturers may be deterred from entering or expanding into a
particular market because they will not be able to effectively utilize the
independent distributorship system. 9' Smaller manufacturers who do
enter the market are automatically put at a competitive disadvantage
because larger manufacturers can afford to vertically integrate forward
and obtain the competitive benefits flowing from their power to impose
post-sale restrictions on their distributors.92
In GTE SvIania, the Supreme Court found the threat of forward
vertical integration to be a compelling factor for overruling the Schwinn
per se rule:
We also note that per se rules in this area may work to the ultimate detriment
of the small businessmen who operate as franchisees. To the extent that a per
se rule prevents a firm from using the franchise system to achieve efliciencies
that it perceives as important to its successful operation, the rule creates an
incentive for vertical integration into the distribution system, thereby elimi-
nating to that extent the role of independent businessmen."'
The same reasoning justifies overruling the Albrecht per se rule. After
Albrecht, many newspapers closed down or vertically integrated forward.
Like nonprice vertical restrictions, vertical maximum resale price re-
straints are often necessary if the manufacturer is going to be able "to
achieve efficiencies that it perceives as important to its successful opera-
tion. 94  As former FTC Commissioner Elman observed: "Of all the
elements in the marketing strategy of a manufacturer of consumer goods.
probably none is so crucial to his competitive survival and success as the
price at which his goods are offered for sale to the public."
9
'
89. See. e.g.. Jones. sit)ra note 83.at7l9-21. Vertical integratWn forward could occut cithtc h
merger or by internal expansion. Expansion by the former method ina% not entail tile eVpelne
required when expansion occurs internally. Either method. howeser. %%ill generall% be more costis
than an independent-distributor relationship.
90. Pollock, supra note 83. at 610.
91. See. e.g.. SanduraCo. v. FTC. 339 F.2d 847(6th Cir. 1964).:Snap-on- I ools%, I (.32 I .2d
825 (7th Cir. 1963).
92. Jones. mupra note 83. at 720:
The need for adequate distribution channels which %s ill effectively promote the manhtilactur-
ers' goods spurs many large corporations who can afford the -ost to integrate Nerticall,
forsard so that they can control their product all the way from fte plant to the retail counter
from which the retailer will purchase. This alternatise is open. hoseser, only to the largest
corporations and frequently only to those with a relatively large product mix which can
utilize the same distribution channels. Their smaller and more specialiled competitors with
fewer financial resources and a less diverse product mix must depend.for their economic
survival on their ability to establish strong distribution organizations,
93. 433 U.S. at 57 n.26.
94. IhL
95. Elman. lupra note 33. at 631. See also Boro%% it/. Prit i g Probhleln in Distributor u,'d
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B. Some Alleged Aticompetitii'e Effects of Mlaximum Resale
Price Restraints
In Albrecht, the Supreme Court suggested several anticompetitive
effects that might occur if vertical maximum resale price restraints were
not condemned by a per se rule of illegality.9 6 The anticompetitive effects.
however, were not shown actually to exist in the Albrecht case, or in any
other case. To apply a per se rule under such circumstances completely
thwarts the intent of Congress in enacting section 1 of the Sherman Act.
As Justice Harlan states in his dissent in Albrecht: "The question . . . is
not whether dictation of maximum prices is ever illegal, but whether it is
alttar illegal." 97  Moreover, the traditional rule of reason standard
measures the net competitive effect of a commercial practice upon compe-
tition. Only if the anticompetitive effects of the practice outweigh its
procompetitive effects is the practice declared to be illegal undersection I.
The GTE Sy-lvania decision exemplifies this balancing principle. The
Court was willing to tolerate the elimination of intrabrand competition
because, on balance, a greater amount of interbrand competition was
created. S Thus. even if a vertical maximum resale price restraint can be
shown to have anticompetitive effects in a particular case, it must also be
shown that those anticompetitive effects outweigh the proven procompeti-
tive effects.
The first anticompetitive consequence proffered by the Albrecht
Court was that "[m]aximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to
furnish services essential to the value which goods have for the consumer
or to furnish services and conveniences which consumers desire and for
which they are willing to pav.""9 As Professor Posner points out: "[This]
reason implies that the manufacturers misconceive their self-interest, and
seems hardly an appropriate basis for a per se rule." ""' Why would a
manufacturer establish a maximum resale price that would decrease his
output? The fundamental assumption of antitrust economics is that a firm
seeks to maximize its profits. Certainly. a manufacturerwould not seek to
prevent its distributors from providing point of sale services that increase
product marketability and total output.''
This first economic argument makes it apparent that the Supreme
Court did not understand, or refused to accept, the basic fact that a
maximum resale price restraint is primarily a "defensive" measure used by
the manufacturer to increase the overall competition in its product. For
Franchise Srstems. 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 258 (1969): Comment, Antitrust Limitations on Price
Maintenance. Market Division and Quality Controls in Franchise Agreements, 23 Sw. L.J. 671 (1969).
96. 390 U.S. at 152-53.
97. 390 U.S. at 165 (Harlan..I.. dissenting).
98. 433 U.S. at 51-59.
99. 390 U.S. at 152-53.
100. Posncr. szqura note 33. at 292.
101. See ge muralli- Bork. mupra note 67. at 429-65: Posner.supra note 33. at 283-99.
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example, the Court also argued that "schemes to fix maximum prices, by
substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the
competitive market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to
compete and survive in that market."' 2 Once again, the Supreme Court
misconceives the manufacturer's interest in imposing maximum resale
prices. The manufacturer does not want to destroy the distributors that it
needs to distribute its product.
Second, the Supreme Court stated that "[m]aximum price fixing may
channel distribution through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers
who otherwise would be subject to significant nonprice competition. "
This argument appears to be a corollary of the first. If a manufacturer
sets its maximum resale price level too low, most resellers will be forced out
of business because they will not be able to provide the necessary point of
sale services to sell the manufacturer's product at a profit. Therefore, only
a few large or specifically advantaged dealers will survive. This argument
again ignores the manufacturer's interest in profit maximization. Certain-
ly a manufacturer will attempt to minimize its distribution costs, but only
to the extent of increasing its profits. 0 4 If the distributor wants to make
excessive profits, or to be inefficient, then to the extent a maximum resale
price restraint forces these resellers out of the distribution business, the
restraint promotes the underlying policies of the Sherman Act.
Third, the Albrecht Court stated that "if the actual price charged
under a maximum price scheme is nearly always the fixed maximum price,
which is increasingly likely as the maximum price approaches the actual
cost of the dealer, the scheme tends to acquire all the attributes of an
arrangement fixing 'iinimum prices. '' t 5  What the, Supreme Court is
actually saying is that maximum resale prices could become a disguise for
minimum price fixing. As one commentator on Albrecht points out:
"There seems to be no reason why this is or should always be true. To
surmount the majority's suspicion, it is only necessary to show that a
difference between the market price and the announced maximum price
exists."t0 6 Indeed, it is possible that a manufacturer could be coerced by
its resellers to adopt a maximum resale price agreement that, in reality, was
a minimum resale price agreement, but this possibility can be policed
adequately under the rule of reason standard.'0 7
102. 390 U.S. at 152.
103. Id. at 153.
104. The Supreme Court recognized this economic argument in GTF.Svnia:
"Generally, a manufacturer would prefer the lowest retail price possible. once its price to
dealers has been set. because a lower retail price means increased ,,ales and higher manulac-
turer revenues".... In this context, a manufacturer is likely to view the dilference betwcen
the price at which it sells to its retailers and their price to the consumer as its "cost of
distribution." which it would prefer to minimize.
433 U.S. at 56 n.24.
105. 390 U.S. at 153.
106. Comment. supra note 33. at 485.
107. On balance, it would seem more appropriate to develop a "sham" exception to the rule (i
reason standard for vertical maximum resale price restraints,
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Finally, although unarticulated in the Albrechit decision, another
possible anticompetitive consequence is that maximum resale prices
could be used offensively by the manufacturer to keep his profits at a low
enough level to discourage the market entry of new competitors. This
potential anticompetitive consequence merely presents a question of fact
concerning the manufacturer's motive, which can also be policed ade-
quately under the rule of reason standard. When the procompetitive
effects of vertical maximum resale price restraints are balanced against the
alleged anticompetitive effects, it becomes abundantly clear that the
Albrecht per se rule cannot meet the standards enunciated in GTE
Sylvania.
IV. SOME ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS
A. Discarding Antiquated Notions of Economic Freedom:
GTE Sivlvania
The GTE SrIvania decision marks a complete reversal of the Supreme
Court's policy toward vertical restrictions. For years the Supreme Court
has relied upon notions of "economic freedom," derived from ancient
property concepts, to justify outlawing manufacturer-imposed vertical
restrictions. In Dr. Miles,'°s Justice Hughes relied in part upon the
common-law doctrine against equitable servitudes on chattels to support
his conclusion that a per se rule should be applied to minimum resale price
restraints:
"If a man," says Lord Coke .... be possessed of a horse or any other
chattel, real or personal, and gives his whole interest or property therein.
upon condition that the donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is
void, because his whole interest and property is out of him, so as he hath no
possibility of reverter: and it is against trade and traffic and bargaining and
contracting between man and man."' "
Later decisions interpreted Dr. Miles to mean that a manufacturer unduly
interferes with the economic freedom of his distributors if he attempts to
impose post-sale restrictions upon his products. For example, in United
States v. A. Schrader's Son, h., the Supreme Court held that minimum
resale prices were per se illegal because those agreements were "designed to
take away dealers' control of their own affairs and thereby destroy
competition."' "
In Schiwinn. the Supreme Court once again relied upon the common-
law doctrine against equitable servitudes on chattels in the context of
nonprice vertical restrictions. "2 The pivotal fact in Schiwinn was the
108. See note 46 and accomnpanying tet wupra.
109. 220 i'.S. at 404-05.
110. 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
III. Mdat 100.
112. 388 U.S. at 379.
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passage of title. All nonprice vertical restrictions were held to be per se
illegal when title passed, but such restrictions were evaluated and sustained
under the rule of reason when title had not passed. 13 The Schwinn Court
held that to impose nonprice vertical restrictions in sale transactions would
"violate the ancient rule against restraints on alienation."1 4 Less than a
year later, the Albrecht Court summarily applied a per se rule of illegality
to vertical maximum resale price restraints by stating that maximum resale
price agreements, "no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the
freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance
with their own judgment."'' 15
In GTE Sylvania, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the alienation of
property rationale by relegating its importance to a footnote." 6  More
importantly, the Court rejected the "economic freedom" justification for
outlawing vertical restrictions:
We are similarly unable to accept Judge Browning's interpretation of
Schwinn. In his dissent below he argued that the decision reflects the view
that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy
of independent businessmen even though they have no impact on "price,
quality and quantity of goods and services" ....This view is certainly not
explicit in Schwinn, which purports to be based on an examination of the
"impact (of the restrictions) upon the marketplace." . . . Competitive
economies have social and political as well as economic advantages ....
but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any
objective benchmarks.'17
Thus, the GTE Sylvania decision makes clear that notions of economic
freedom based upon ancient property concepts cannot substitute for a
demonstration that vertical restrictions have actual, anticompetitive
effects in the marketplace. This new approach by the Court provides an
additional reason for overruling Albrecht.18
113. Id. at 379-80.
114. Id.at380.
115. 390 U.S. at 152 (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &Sons, 340 U.S. 211,
213 (1951)).
116. Footnote 21 provides in relevant part:
The Court also stated that to impose vertical restrictions in sale transactions would "violate
the ancient rule against restraints on alienation." . . . We quite agree with Mr. Justice
Stewart's dissenting comment in Schwinn that "the state of the common law 400 or even 100
years ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical
distributional restraints in the American economy today."
433 U.S. at53 n.21.
117. Id..
118. Another important aspect of the GTE Syhs'ania decision is the Court's recognition that
vertical restrictions have "redeeming virtues." Id. at 54. The Court took judicial notice that there is
substantial scholarly and judicial authority supporting their economic argument that "[vlertical
restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturers to achieve certain
efficiencies in the distribution of his product." Id. at 54. Professor Posner recently wrote: "Another
precedent threatened by Sylvania is Albrecht v. Herald Co. . . .The logic of SyIvania is that
restrictions imposed on dealers by manufacturers promote interbrand competition and are therefore
not per se illegal, save perhaps if the manufacturer has a monopoly. That logic demolishes Aibrecht,"
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45
U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 12(1977).
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B. The Effect of Footnote Eighteen
Although GTE Sylvania sets the stage for overruling Albrecht, a
potential obstacle is created by the Supreme Court's express limitation of
the impact of its decision to nonprice vertical restrictions. In footnote
eighteen of the opinion, the Court stated: "As in Schwinn, we are
concerned here only with nonprice vertical restrictions. The per se
illegality of price restrictions has been established firmly for many years
and involves significantly different questions of analysis and policy."1 19
Close examination of footnote eighteen, however, reveals the Court was
referring only to minimum price restrictions. For example, only the per se
rule of illegality for minimum resale price agreements has been "estab-
lished firmly for many years"; the per se rule of illegality for vertical
maximum resale price restraints was established in Albrecht, which was
not decided until almost a year after the Schwinn per se rule that was
overruled in GTE Sylvania. Furthermore, in illustrating the "significantly
different questions of analysis and policy," the Court reveals that its real
concern is with minimum resale price agreements:
In his concurring opinion in White Motor Co. v. United States, Mr. Justice
Brennan noted that, unlike nonprice restrictions, "[r]esale price maintenance
is not only designed to, but almost invariably does in fact, reduce price
competition not only among sellers of the affected product, but quite as much
between that product and competing brands." 372 U.S. 253, 268 (1963).
Professor Posner also recognized- that "industrywide resale price mainte-
nance might facilitate cartelizing."'10
Only minimum price fixing "reduce[s] price competition . . . among
sellers of the affected product," and only minimum price fixing can
"facilitate cartelizing."' 2' This observation is confirmed by the fact that
White Motor Co., decided five years before the Supreme Court established
a per se rule for maximum price fixing, was not mentioned in Albrecht.
Justice Brennan's statement in White Motor Co. that "resale price
maintenance . . . invariably . . . reduce[s] price competition" ' 2 ob-
viously was directed only at the established, empirical effects of vertical
minimum price maintenance.
Professor Posner and other economists have equated the economic
effects of minimum retail price restraints and other nonprice vertical
restrictions because both can potentially increase nonprice competition
and point of sale services by eliminating the "free rider" effect. 2 3 These
19. 433 U.S. at51 n.18.
120. Id.
121. See notes 45-62 and accompanying text supra.
122. 372 U.S. at 268.
123. The "free rider" effect is based upon the economic argument that distributors of a
manufacturer's product will not provide necessary point of sale services, such as advertising.
showrooms, or servicing, for the product in a freely competitive environment because there wsill always
be a few distributors who will not provide such services. The latter distributors will take a "free ride
on the services provided by other distributors. The "free riders" will then be able to charge a lower
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two vertical restraints are designed to eliminate intrabrand price competi-
tion in the hope of increasing interbrand competition. 124 This economic
reasoning led Justice White in his concurring opinion in GTE Sylvania to
conclude that "[lt]he effect, if not the intention, of the Court's opinion is
necessarily to call into question the firmly established per se rule against
price restraints.' 25  It seems evident that footnote eighteen was included
to dispel Justice White's fears.126  Vertical maximum resale price re-
straints, however, cannot be compared to minimum resale price restraints
or nonprice vertical restrictions, because maximum resale price agree-
ments are not designed to eliminate intrabrand price competition in the
hope of increasing interbrand competition.127  Thus, the Supreme Court's
statement in footnote eighteen that "some commentators have argued that
the manufacturer's motivation for imposing vertical price restrictions may
be the same as for nonprice restrictions"' 121 is inapposite to vertical
maximum resale price restraints.
Moreover, in the latter portion of footnote eighteen, the Court
recognizes that "Congress recently has expressed its approval of a per se
analysis of vertical price restrictions by repealing the provisions of the
Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts allowing fair trade pricing at the option
of the individual State."'' 29 This further confirms that footnote eighteen
was directed only at vertical minimum resale price restrictions. As
discussed earlier, the fair trade laws were repealed because of the over-
whelming evidence that minimum resale price restraints caused higher
prices; there was no evidence introduced in those congressional hearings
that maximum resale price agreements also caused higher prices. 30 In
fact, Representative McClory, one of the original sponsors of the Consu-
mer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, stated that the Act was not intended to
apply to vertical maximum resale price restraints:
price and thus deprive the providingdistributors oftheeconomic benefit of their additional investment
in point of sale services. Moreover, consumer satisfaction will be frustrated because consumers
cannot get needed point of sale services for their products. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 33, at 283-85.
The "free rider" effect was recently recognized by the Supreme Court in GTE Syvania as a valid
economic justification for nonprice vertical restrictions. 433 U.S. at 55'
124. Economists who support the business need for minimum price restraints based upon the
"free rider" effect argue that the manufacturer will set the price at the lowest possible level necessary to
provide efficient point of sale services because a lower retail price means increased sales, and therefore,
higher manufacturer revenues. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 33, at 287-88. In theory, the manufaetur-
er's product is now more competitive in the interbrand market because it is able to provide point ofsale
services along with the product. But see Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions:
White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1419 (1968).
125. 433 U.S. at 70 (White, J., concurring).
126. "[S]ome commentators have argued that the manufacturer's motivation for imposing
vertical price restrictions may be the same as for nonprice restrictions, There are, however, significant
differences that could easily justify different treatment." 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
127. In fact, vertical maximum resale price restraints have no effect on intrabrand price
competition.
128. 433U.S. at51 n.18.
129. Id.
130. See 1975 Senate Fair Trade Hearings, supra note 56.
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During our hearings on this legislation, we made a concerted effort to
investigate all of the legal ramifications of this act. . . . Indeed, it was our
feeling after these hearings that the current program of maximum price
maintenance is not included within the McGuire Act, and, therefore, no
exceptions need be made in this repealer for businesses operating under such
a maintenance program.'
3 1
In short, a close examination of footnote eighteen in GTESylvania reveals
that it does not present an obstacle to overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co.
V. CONCLUSION
In GTE Sylvania the Supreme Court held that commercial business
practices should not be proscribed by a per se rule of illegality in section I
litigation unless empirical economic evidence establishes that such practi-
ces have or are likely to have a "pernicious effect on competition'13 2 or that
they"lack . . . any redeeming virtue."'133 This Article demonstrates that
the Albrecht per se rule cannot meet the criteria enunciated by the
Supreme Court in GTE Sylvania and, therefore, that Albrecht v. Herald
Co. should be overruled. The Supreme Court has never had extensive
experience with maximum resale price restraints and this commercial
practice has never been proved to have manifestly anticompetitive effects.
In fact, this Article demonstrates that the procompetitive effects of
maximum resale price restraints far outweigh any alleged anticompetitive
effects of maximum resale price restraints.
131. 121 CONG. REC. H23660 (daily ed. July21, 1975).
132. 433 U.S. at 50 (quoting Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States. 356 U.S.1. 5 (1958)).
133. Id.
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